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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANGELO RA YARINO, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
HARRY PRICE, JR., and MRS. 
HARRY PRICE, JR., his wife, and Case No. 7882 
MRS. MARCUS PARR, also known 
as ARLINDA PRICE PARR, 
Defendants and A ptJellants. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLAN:TS 
EXCEPTION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
STATEMENT· OF' FACT 
Appellants except strenuously to the statement of 
facts presented in respondent's brief. It is to be observed. 
at. the outset that such statement of facts is very brief 
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and only spottedly supported by reference to the record. 
Respondent, in his statement of facts and through-
out the brief, continually refers to Harry Price "assent-
ing to a deal" and make it appear that the deal is the 
same cash transaction as resulted in this judgment of 
specific performance. This is not the case. When their 
witness refers to such assent it was assent to the trade 
and not to the terms of Exhibit "E." Nobody ever dis-
cussed Exhibit "E" with Harrry Price. 'See appellants' 
brief, P. 26, et. seq., for evdience as to this. 
This case can be reduced to this simple proposition 
which the statement of facts of respondent completely 
disregards. These are briefly this : 
A refuses to sell his property for cash. B desires 
A's property, so a trade is arranged between A and C and 
a sale by C to A. For some reason the trade between A 
and C cannot be consummated, the reason being im-
Inaterial. Is A nevertheless required to convey his prop-
erty to C for cash~ The answer to this question, both 
legally and equitably, is obviously "no." 
Under these facts referred to which is this case the 
conveyance by A is conditional on the reception by him 
of C's property. In other words, there is no obligation 
upon A to convey until C's property is conveyed to him. 
The statement of facts of respondent as made in hi::; 
brief would make it appear that there was no such trade 
or three-cornered arrangement under the evidence pre-
sented at the trial herein, and, for this reason, the fol· 
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lowing testin1ony is presented to this court which con-
clusiYely shows that there was such an arrangement, and 
that every witness who te~tified ~o understood it. 
At the time of the trial, Hansen intimates that it 
was a direct sale by Price to Ravarino, the purchase 
price to be paid by Prices to ~Iollerups for the l\iollerup 
property. This, however, was not the understanding of 
anybody connected with this transaction, and warping 
the matter in this manner seriously prejudices the Prices, 
both tax-wise and in the forn1 the~· desire their assets 
to be, i.e., forces then1 to take cash instead of real estate. 
In view of the fact that re:'pondent in his statement 
of facts represents that the matter was not a three-way 
transaction, a few n1ore excerpts frmn the record should 
be helpful. :Jir. Hansen in his deposition and at the 
trial has testified under oath as follows (R. 104): 
"Q. Now, on this deal that is involved here, it was 
a strict trade, was it not? It was a three-
way proposition front the beginning? 
"A. That's right." 
(R. 105) 
"Q. And the Prices conveying was dependent 
upon receiving the ~.follerup property first 1 
"A. Yes, it was one deal. 
"Q. One deal~ 
"A. That's right." 
Ravarino also knew a trade was involved. Hansen 
testified as follows (R. 136) : 
''Q. But he (Ravarino) knew about the trade~ 
"A. He did later, but-
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"A. Yes, he knew we were trying to negotiate a 
trade. 
"Q. And he knew there had to be a trade before 
the Prices would convey~ 
"A. Yes, I think he-
"Q. You told him-you and :Mr. Rich told him, 
did you not, at one time in your office1 
"A. Over here in the office of the 0 P A. 
"Q. But you knew that Mr. Ravarino was told 
that~ 
"A. Yes, we were working out a trade." 
Mr. Rich also testifies to the same (R. 156): 
"Q. Then when the final deal came, the down pay-
ment was to be of the Price property instead 
of the cash~ 
"A. That's right." 
All doubt is removed as to the nature of this deal by 
papers presented to Prices to conclude the transaction. 
The real estate contract wherein Prices' trade with Mol-
lerup does not say that there is to be a cash payment, 
but does say this after providing for monthly payments 
(Exhibit "F"): 
"• • • as additional payment for said prop-
erty the said buyers have tran~ferred to the said 
sellers by warranty deed certain real estate in 
Block 31, Plat A, Salt Lake City Survey, as de-
scribed in a copy of said warranty deed attached 
hereto and made a part hereof." 
This warranty deed is Exhibit "H." 
Referring to these exhibits, Mr. Ben Rich, who was 
an independent witness, had this to say (R. 155) : 
"Q. And these documents, they are the deeds and 
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various things you testified you had drawn 
that affected the proposition in accordance 
with your instructions 1 
"A. Fron1 ~lr. Hansen, yes sir.'" 
~Ir. Schluter, the banker who appraised the Moiler-
up and Price property, testifies as to his understanding 
of the transaction contemplated by the parties, as follows 
(R. 222): 
''Q. Did you appraise any routes next to or ad-
jacent to the Price warehouse ? 
"A. No, that wasn't in the tradf~." 
(R. 224) 
''Q. She wanted to know what they should get 
for their property? 
"A. She wanted my valuation of the property 
they were trading and also my valuation of 
the !follerup deal." 
(R. 225) 
"Q. Did they show you any Earnest Money Re-
ceipt at that time? 
"A. No, nothing had been signed to n1y knowledge 
at that time. They were merely concerned 
with the trade at the time they asked me to 
appraise both properties." 
H. L. Mulliner testified (R. 230) : 
"Mr. I-Iansen called me at least twice to ask 
me if Harry had decided to go through on the deal 
and that he had better make up his mind right 
away because he said first he thought they had 
another purchaser if he wasn't going to take the 
( Mollerup) property." 
and further : 
"My purpose in this, Your Honor, is to show 
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that at this late of a date, Mr. Hansen and Mr. 
Rich were still trying to get the Prices to accept 
the Mollerup deal." 
The testimony of Edgar C. Jensen with regard to 
this transaction is highly important and entitled to con-
siderable weight in view of his relation with the parties. 
He had been, and was at the tin1e these matters arose, 
the attorney for Mr. Hansen (R. 210) and had known 
him for a number of years. The reading of his testimony 
shows beyond question that he tried to be as fair as 
possible. 
Mr. Jensen testified that his understanding of this 
transaction and knowledge thereof was obtained through 
Mr. Price and through Mr. Hansen and that the only 
transaction contemplated was a trade of the Price prop-
erty for the Mollerup property, and that Ravarino's 
name was never mentioned, nor was a cash sale con-
sidered (R. 207, 208, 213, 214, 215). No documents in-
volving Ravarino were submitted to him for approval 
in behalf of the Prices. 
In addition to the testimony quoted above by the in-
dependent witnesses, we have the positive statements 
of the various defendants that the transaction involved 
a trade. Everything in this case. points conclusively 
to the fact that the conveyance by the Prices was condi-
·tioned upon their receiving the Mollerup property. If 
this were not so, why should half of this record and half 
of respondent's brief be concerned with the Mollerup 
real estate~ 
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Ben Rich, a wi tnes~ railed by respondent, testif1ed 
unequivocally that a trade wa:;; involved and even went 
so far as to sub1nit a hypothetical case to the Bureau of 
Internal Revenue which a~sun1ed the san1e facts a~ he 
thought existed as between ~Iollerup and I >rice, and 
whirh are the san1e fact~ propounded here hy defend-
ants. 
The question of eredibility of witness now become 
important in view of the position taken by respondent 
in his brief. Lewis Hansen is the only witness who sus-
tains in any manner the position of respondent in this ac-
tion. He was successfully impeached by Edgar C. Jensen 
(R. 206, 210, 212) and H. L. :Jlulliner (R. 227, 228, 232, 
233). He was flatly contradicted by the plaintiff. His 
sworn statements taken during his deposition and even 
at the trial are contradictory as can be seen from the 
following examples : 
As indicated above, he had no aversion, prior to 
the trial and while under oath, to speaking of this trans-
action as a trade between l\lollerup and Price, or a three-
way deal, or that Prices' receiving the ltf ollerup property 
was a condition to the transfer of their own property 
(R. 104, 105, 133). 
Another example is that when his deposition was 
taken, he testified that Exhibit "1~" and "J" were not 
signed at the same time and they obviously were not. 
(R. 112) 
"Q. But they weren't executed simultaneously1 
"A. No, not the same time. 
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"Q. Exhibit 2 signed one day and Exhibit 3 signed 
another day? 
"A. Well, I made them both the same day, but 
it was right close in there." 
At the trial he testified that both were signed simul-
taneously ( R. 110) in the coffee shop by Mrs. Price. 
Another example: In his deposition when asked 
whether Ravarino knew about the trade while negotia-
tions were going on, he answered (R. 110): "Yes, he knew 
we were trying to negotiate a trade." On the trial he 
testified that Ravarino did not know about a trade until 
long after October 5. 
Another example: In his deposition (R. 126) Mr. 
Hansen testified that he could have told Mrs~ Price that 
Ravarino had bought the Terry property prior to Octo-
ber 5th. The fact that he did is confirmed by Mr. 
Schluter's testimony (R. 221, 222, 224). He denies this 
at the triaL 
Another example: His testimony at the trial is com-
pletely contradictory as to whether a copy of Exhibit "E" 
was delivered to Mrs. Price. The fact of the matter is 
that H. L. M ulliner had to. procure a photostatic copy 
of Exhibit "E" after the suit was filed in order to find 
out what it contained. More will be stated on this later. 
This subject is particularly interesting and the Court is 
referred to the following instances of Hansen's testify-
ing on this subject with the varying results. At P. 81 
of the record, Hansen testifies that Mrs. Price would 
have one and Ravarino would have one. At P. 96, line 
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27, he testifies I-Iarry had n copy of Exhibit "E." At P. 
11-1, 115, he testifies he didn •t give l\1 r~. Price a eopy. 
At P. ~37, he testifies that he rlid not give a ropy of Ex-
hibit "E.' to :Jf r~. Price. 
If Harry Price had ever ~een Exhibit .. E," he would 
have had to see the copy given l\Ir:-:;. Prire, if she was ever 
given one, because Hansen testified Harry had never 
seen Exhibit "E" or been m~ked to sig·n it (R. R:2, 96). 
There is also a very interesting thing connected with 
this Exhibit ••E'' which bears heavily on the interest 
of Lewis Hansen in this action. In the first place, there 
was no reason whatsoevet, in view of the way the trans-
action was set up, for having an Earnest :Money Receipt 
wherein the Prices appear as Seller and Ravarino ap-
pears as Buyer. The original Earnest Money herein ex-
ecuted on August 8th by Ravarino anticipated a cash 
sale for $18,000.00, and if this was the agreement as con-
tended for by respondent all that would have been neces-
sary was that the Prices sign the agreement already ex-
ecuted by Ravarino (Exhibit 2). This, however, was not 
done. 
Subsequently, according to Hansen, he raised the 
price to $19,000.00 and Exhibit "E" was signed. Mrs. 
Parr and Mrs. Price stoutly maintain that the blanks 
were not filled in when they signed it. Their version 
of this would see1n to be correct in view of the fact, as 
was pointed out in our original brief, P. 84 et seq. :Mrs. 
Price was well versed enough in business matters so 
that she would not agree to convey her property to Mol-
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lerup and at the same time agree to convey her property 
to Ravarino. 
Notwithstanding that the price Ravarino was willing 
to pay had been increased to $19,000.00, the deeds and 
contracts of sale, Exhibit "F," were drawn with the 
understanding that the Price property was to be taken 
in for $18,000.00 of the $35,000.00 purchase price, leaving 
a balance of $17,000.00 payable. In such event, the $1,-
000.00 difference between $18,000.00 and $19,000.00 
should have been paid in cash by Hansen to the Prices. 
Now here in this record is there any intimation that this 
was to be done or was even considered by Hansen. 
So, if on October 19th the Prices and Mrs. Parr had 
signed Exhibit "F," Hansen would have paid Mollerup 
$18,000.00 of Ravarino's money for a deed from Mollerup 
and retained $1,000.00 for himself. This is the only rea-
son why Exhibit uE" was ever executed. This conclusion 
is confirmed again by the fact that Exhibit "E," or a 
copy thereof, was never furnished the defendants. 
This fact of Hansen's gaining $1,000.00 also indi-
cates his interest in having this deal closed. This fact 
is further confirmed by the fact that when the final 
papers to consummate this transaction were tendered to 
defendants, there is not one of such documents made in 
pursuance of the execution of Exhibit "E" or to carry 
out its terms according to its provisions. This fact is 
confirmed 'again by the inconsistent position that Hansen 
was placed in and illustrated by the conflicting and con-
tradictory statements he has made during the course of 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the preparation and trial of this case, a few examples 
of 'vhich were set out hereinabove. 
It is a Yery difficult thing for plaintiff to explain 
why, if Exhibit "E'' is to remain effective, that the final 
papers which were to be executed disregarded totally 
everything that is contained in Exhibit "E." Respondent 
attempts to do this by saying that this method of clos-
ing the transaction was done only for the "eonvenienee" 
of defendants. 
In these days, the tax consequences of any business 
transaction, and particularly transfers of real estate, are 
of prime significance to the parties involved. This is 
common knowledge and the tax effect largely determines 
whether business can be done and in every case how it 
should be done. To label this feature a "convenienee" 
is the ultimate in understatement. 
It is also a fact that persons who own property 
are entitled in their dealing with it to retain such prop-
erty in the form they desire. Defendants obviously and 
admittedly desired their assets to remain in the form 
of income-producing property rather than cash. This 
is not a "convenience." 
The judgment of the trial Court deprives these de-
fendants of these two rights to which they are entitled 
by enforcing an Earnest Money Receipt which was never 
intended to represent the transaction involved in this 
case by anybody who had anything to do with it. 
11 
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---------------========c--- -
Finally, the existence of estoppel as against Harry 
Price, or the factual situation as contended for by re-
spondent, can conclusively be shown not to exist by the 
following example: 
Assume that on October 13th, the day upon which 
the final paper were presented, that Mollerup had not 
signed them and that the transaction as presented to 
the Prices and Mrs. Parr was executed by them. Next, 
assume that when these documents were presented to 
Mollerup, he refused to sign the contract and deed to 
Ravarino. Could Ravarino insist that Exhibit "E" be 
given effect as against the Prices~ The answer is quite 
obviously no. Yet, the Prices and Mrs. Parr would have 
performed according to the "deal." 
There is, however, no difference in principle between 
the fictitious situation presented above and that involved 
in this case. In both instances the contentional factor 
of the Mollerup trade failed to materialize and yet the 
trial Court did grant specific performance under the 
terms of Exhibit "E." A rule of law or equity which 
would make this distinction between the fictitious case 
stated above and the one which actually existed is wholly 
without logic and reason. In neither case can the ele-
ments of estoppel be made out. This example shall be 
referred to when each of respondent's points are dis-
cussed hereinafter. 
In other words, it is submitted that if the Prices and 
Mrs. Parr had signed and Mollerup failed to perform 
there could be no possible liability on the part of the 
12 
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Prices and Parr to Ravarino and that the same conten-
tions and rules of law and equity should be applied in 
the instant case. 
POINT I. 
THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT AS MADE ARE 
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Respondent continually refers to the fact that no 
objection to the findings of the trial Court was or IS 
being 1nade by appellants. This is not ~-· .. e case. 
Appellants at the time of the trial and in this Court 
insist that the findings of fact in this case should be that 
a trade between Mollerup and Price and a sale by l\fol-
lerup to Ravarino represents the true facts, and that any 
conveyance therefor, by Prices and ~Irs. Parr, w·as condi-
tioned upon a receipt by them of the l\Iollerup property. 
Appellants feel their position is sound in this re-
spect because every person who testified in this case 
represented to the trial Court that this was the exact 
situation, except ~{r. Hansen, and Mr. Hansen upon his 
deposition testified to the same, so we have a condition 
here where every witness at a trial has testified to a set 
of facts, under oath, at one ti1ne or another, and the trial 
Court has completely disregarded such testimony. 
If this testimony had been followed it would have 
been absolutely unnecessary to lnake the findings on the 
evidentiary matter~ contained in Point I of respondent's 
brief, under Sub-sections a, b, c, and d. All of these find-
ings in the sub-sections are mere recitals of evidence 
13 
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and are not findings on the issues raised by the pleadings 
and evidence in this action. 
The issue squarely presented to the trial Court was: 
a. Whether the transaction as a whole constituted 
a three-way deal including Prices, Mollerups and Ravar-
ino, whereby the conveyance by Prices and Parr was 
conditioned upon them receiving the Mollerup property, 
or 
b. vVhether there was an outright contract of sale, 
the terms of which were understood by all involved, 
whereby Prices agreed to sell for $19,000.00 cash to 
Ravarino. In this connection it is important to note that 
not one person, even Hansen, testified in support of this 
set of facts and yet the Court, by injecting a number of 
immaterial findings, reaches this conclusion. 
The portion of appellants' brief directed to this prob-
lem is found at Page 60, where it is argued that the 
lower Court's decision is contrary to all the evidence. 
The foregoing portions of this brief have been devoted 
to further illustrate this. 
':l_1he law in such situation is set out in our original 
brief commencing at Page 60. Respondent does not con-
trove-rt this law or argue it; nor does he attempt to 
answer the factual argument made there; nor does he 
contend that the law is different from that which is Ret 
out. 
Under sub-section I-a of respondent's brief, it is 
argued that the signatures of the women upon Exhibit 
14 
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"E" were not conditioned upon the signature of Harry 
Price. 
The n1ere state1nen t of their claim in this respect is 
not supported by any evidence in this ease. 'rhere wa~ 
no "assent" to the terms of Exhibit ··E." The only "as-
sent" was to the trade. 
On this particular feature of evidence, the Court's 
attention is also directed to the fact that Thf r. Hanson told 
Ed Jensen that the signatures on this exhibit were made 
conditionally. See the record at 209, 210 and 212. 
The matter of these signatures being conditional 
is not of any special importance in this case except to in-
dicate uncertainty in Exhibit "E." The important thing 
is whether a conveyance hy the Prices was conditional 
upon their receipt of the ~Iollerup property. This is the 
issue upon which a finding of fact should have been 
made by the Court. 
The argument of respondent in support of his Point 
No. I-a will now be referred to. It is interesting to note 
that on August 8th, it is admitted that Rava.rino's offer 
of $18,000.00 for the Price property was declined, and 
then Hansen started showing the Prices other property. 
If no trade was involved, why was it necessary for Han-
sen to proceed further in showing properties to the de-
fendants1 
The next argument is contained in the last para-
graph of Page 17 of respondent's brief. This is presented 
as a statement of fact and consists of a verbatim state-
15 
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ment of Hansen as to what occurred in the coffee shop 
on 'September 21st. This statement is to the effect that 
Hansen raised the price of the Prices' property $1,000.00 
and reduced the price of the Mollerup property from 
$36,000.00 to $35,000.00, at which time Mrs. Price signed 
it. This statement is almost fantastic in view of what 
transpired later, especially when the Price property on 
the final closing was valued at $18,000.00 under all the 
evidence in this case. Also, Ravarino did not authorize 
Hansen to pay $19,000.00 until October 5th. 
However, if any truth at all can be attributed to this 
statement of Hansen's, it still must be conceded that the 
Prices conveying their property to anyone was depend-
ent upon their receiving Mollerup's property. By this 
statement of Hansen, he concedes this and it is further 
confirmed by the fact that he drew up the final papers 
along this line, with the exception that $18,000.00 was 
to be allowed instead of $19,000.00. 
If such a conversation took place, Mrs. Price would 
surely have seen that at some time in the proceeding she 
received credit for $19,000.00, but even IIansen cannot 
state that she made such a claim. 
On Page 18, the statement is made that when Mrs. 
Parr came into Hansen's office she signed "E" and "J" 
without question and ~fr. Hansen denied making any 
representations whatsoever to her. Page 82 of the record 
is quoted in support of this. There is nothing at Page 
82 that even suggests such a thing. lvfr. Hansen states 
that he had no conversation that he could remember 
16 
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with ~Irs. Parr (R. 84). Cmnpare the testilnony of Mrs. 
Parr as to this signing. \\""ith the fact in ulind that thi~ 
was probably the only real estate transaction she had 
ever engaged in, nothing to the contrary appears. r:rhis 
testimony conunences at the bottmn of Page 188 and is 
as logical and sounding in truth as it could possibly be. 
Further, it is completely consistent with Hansen's testi-
mony that from the beginning these people were not in-
terested in cash at all. 
In the same paragraph it is asserted that the "whole 
thing was explained to ~[r. Price by l\Irs. Price." And the 
record is quoted at Pages 83 and 84. This is quite inter-
esting. .Jir. Burton i::; trying to direct Mr. Hansen's 
attention to a purported telephone call made to Mr. 
Price by Mr. Hansen, between the time Mrs. Price signed 
Exhibit "E" and 1\t!rs. Parr signed Exhibit "E." Hansen 
stated "he was perfectly fine about it, he seemed anx-
ious," then the next two answers he obviously refers to 
the time (August 8th) when the $18,000.00 cash offer 
contained in Exhibit "2" was declined. 
This is one of the clearest examples 1n Hansen's 
testimony of the erratic 1nanner and flippancy which 
characterizes his testimony. 
It is next argued that there was some effort by the 
women to require .J[ollerup to perfonn. As has been indi-
cated, if Harry Price knew that just the warehouse wa:-; 
to be transferred and $17,000.00, without interest, was 
to be made in in:-;talhnents, he probal)ly would have 
17 
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signed. This is the unde-rstanding the women had and 
thought they could enforce. 
Respondent, in the last paragraph on Page 19 of his 
brief, argued that it is: 
"Clear and convincing, and the evidence is 
overwhelming. That when Exhibit "E" and "J'~ 
were signed by the two women they intended to 
be bound and they intended to perform the trans-
action according to the terms of Exhibit "E." 
There is absolutely no evidence in this case of such 
a fact, not even from Hansen. The positive testimony 
of the women is that by their signing they were author-
izing some negotiations (R. 189, 185, 191). It is ridicu-
lous to make this foregoing statement because if they 
signed "E" and "J" why did they not intend to be bound 
by "E" and "J" and not just "E." Hansen does not even 
maintain this. Their final contention en this point is con-
tained at Page 21 where the bald assertion is made that 
Exhibit "E" "is the agreen1ent of the parties." If this is 
the case and the intention of the parties, why did Mr. 
Hansen proceed to draw the real estate contract and the 
deeds in the manner he did, which gave no effect whatso-
ever to the terms contained in Exhibit "E," but gave 
full effect to Exhibit "J"? See the discussion of the fac-
tual situation on this point in our brief, P. 85 et seq. 
Assuming that the above quoted statement made by 
respondent is true and that the won1en did intend to be 
bound by Exhibits "E" and "J," and which, in fact, they 
did if Exhibit "E" conformed to their intention, why 
18 
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should they be bound anyn1ore by Exhibit ''E" than they 
should be by Exhibit '•J"f And why should they intend 
to perform Exhibit "'E" rather than to perform Exhibit 
"J" '? This staten1ent of respondent points more clearly 
than anything else in hi~ brief to the fallacy of their 
argument and indicate~ beyond any question that the 
theory of appellants, that Exhibit ":B~" was not the con-
tract to be perfonned, is that which is overwhelmingly 
supported by this record. 
The next argument under Point I of respondent's 
brief, sub-section (b), is that Exhibit "E" was filled in 
and in its present fonn, with thr exception of signatures, 
at the time it was signed by the women. The fact that it 
was not so filled in can be demonstrated beyond any 
reasonable doubt. First, it is highly unlikely that Mrs. 
Price, a person who is charged with considerable busineRs 
acumen by respondent in his brief, would sit down with 
~Ir. Hansen and sign off her property to two different 
individuals at the same time. There was also the fact that 
Mrs. Price says that this positively was not done andre-
calls specific social incidents connecterl with her Rigning 
this document. 
The following review of the situation will also tend 
to confirm the fact that this was not done. On the date 
that Exhibit "E" and "J" bear, these two women anti-
cipated a trade of their property for the Mollerup prop-
erty. It would, therefore, seem natural that they should 
sign two memorandums: one to agree to take the Mol-
lerup property, the other one would be to agree to 
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convey their property to Mollerup. 
If the name of Mollerup had been inserted in Exhibit 
"E," the intention of these women and the intention 
of everyone connected with this case would have been 
carried out, and upon this intention being carried out 
the documents presented to them at the final closing 
would have been in accordance with the Earnest Money 
Receipts these women signed rather than in conflict with 
them. 
The most conclusive evidence in this case of the fact 
that this Exhibit "E" was not filled in, is the fact that no 
copies of this Exhibit, in its present form, were seen or 
presented to any of the defendants. Their only knowl-
edge of it, according to their testimony, was when it was 
attached to the original pleading in this case. As indi-
cated, their counsel procured a copy from the attorney 
for plaintiff after the suit was filed. None was attached 
to defendants' copy of the complaint. 
This Exhibit was purportedly signed on September 
21st, and around the 19th of October, Hansen, Rich, and 
the Prices had their conference. At this conference, and 
as indicated by the closing papers, the price of the Mol-
lerup property was $35,000.00 and Prices were not to 
receive $19,000.00 credit, but to receive $18,000.00 credit 
and agree to pay a $17,000.00 balance. Now, if Mrs. Price 
or Harry Price had seen Exhibit "E," they would have 
insisted that there can be only a $16,000.00 balance or 
that they receive $1,000.00 cash. If either of the Prices 
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had known $19,000.00 were involved on Exhibit "E," 
or anyone else, they would have insisted on their re-
ceiving credit for it, but they were not aware of this 
figure until the suit wa~ filed and a copy furnished. 
It is also a fact that if the Prices had seen Exhibit 
··:c·· and the figure $19,000.00 on it, the plan of Hansen 
to obtain an extra $1,000.00 for hin1self could not have 
been carried out hy him. 
There is another interesting fact developed by the 
testimony of the won1en (R. 191). This is that the women 
were as familiar with these lot nmnbers as they could 
possibly be. If Exhibit "E" had been filled in and in its 
present condition showing a sale of the premises at 235 
\Vest 5th South, either of them would have caught this 
mistake because 235 is the small house and 225 is the 
warehouse which they thought they were trading. 
The argument of respondent in his brief on this 
point is as brief as it is lacking in support from this 
Record. The final statement is made in this form from 
page 23: 
"They had been discussing this transaction 
with Hansen for several weeks; particularly ~irs. 
Price was fully aware of every detail includin~ 
a description of the property and the fact that 
defendants were receiving $19,000.00 in cash." 
The Court in reading this Record will not find one 
word of evidence from anyone who testifies including 
Hansen that it was their intention that Prices receive 
$19,000.00 cash. Every person who testified except Han-
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sen stated that the Prices were not to receive cash and 
Hansen drew the papers which provided that Price re-
ceive credit of $18,000.00 for their property on a trade 
and not $19,000.00 which conclusively indicates the in-
tention of Hansen. 
Throughout the argument on this point, it is repeat-
edly stated again and again that the women and Harry 
Price assented and were aware of a deal. The "assent" 
and "deal" were a trade with Mollerup and to this ex-
tent, such statements are true, but are used completely 
out of context. 
The next argument of plaintiff is I-c where the con-
tention is made that Ravarino purchased the Terry strip 
upon reliance of Harry Price's promise to complete the 
transaction. Such contention does not make any sense 
whatsoever unless the term "transaction" has a meaning. 
Not even Hansen, while making some of his wildest state-
ments, testified that Harry Price assented to a cash sale 
of his property for $19,000.00. The transaction above re-
ferred to is the three-way deal. Harry Price under Han-
sen's. testimony, never saw Exhibit "E" and it appears 
that he was not aware of such a document until this case 
was filed. How then can it be said, as it is on Page 23 
of respondent's brief, that he accepted, ratified, and ac-
knowledged Exhibit "E," yet this is incorporated in the 
Findings of F'act. Even under Hansen's testimony, any 
assent given by :Harry Price was assent to the trade ar-
rangement as drawn up by Hansen and not assent to a 
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document which he never saw, knew of', or the tenus of 
which were not incorporated in such transactions. 
The matter of the Mollerup mortgage and of Mol-
lerup needing $5,000.00 i~ next arg·ued b~· respondent. 
The statement that: 
""Harry Price saw no reason after his con-
versation with Hansen why Hansen could not 
turn over to Mollerup $5,000.00 of the $18,000.00 
which was going frmn Ravarino to defendants." 
has absolutely no foundation or support in this evidence 
at all. Harry Price's cmnments with regard to this mat-
ter, if it was ever brought to his attention, indicate clear-
ly that he had no money coming and that if Mollerup was 
in need of funds he should talk to Ravarino or Hansen, 
who was his representative and who was holding Ravor-
ino's money pending the payn1ent of it to Mollerup. 
A startling example of respondent's tactics in trying 
to confuse this Court on this matter is contained at the 
top of Page 30 of his brief where the following statement 
is made: 
"Ravarino purchased the Terry property im-
mediately following the conversation. He gave 
Hansen $19,000.00 at the same time, clearly indi-
cating that he believed, with Price, that the bar-
gain was complete, that only the detail of obtain-
ing the deed remained." 
By this statement he is trying to make the Court believe 
that a deed from Prices and Parr to Ravarino was to be 
executed. There is absolutely no emdence in this case 
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from anyone that this was to be done. The deed referred 
to, if any good faith is to be attributed to this statement, 
is the deed from Prices and Parr to Mollerup. 
In the argument commencing at Page 30 of his brief, 
Section 1-d, plaintiff argues that both of the lots of de-
fendants on 5th South were included in the transaction. 
Harry Price so understood it. The women obviously did 
not. Our contention in this respect is that if such a mis-
understanding exists, no specific performance can be 
granted. See law cited in our opening brief at Pages 81 
and 93. 
In view of the fact that Ravarino purchased only the 
right of way to the rear of the warehouse indicates 
strongly that it was his understanding that only the 
warehouse was to be traded. 
Point is made by respondent that no objection 
was raised to these descriptions at the meeting in Han-
sen's office. There is no evidence that these descriptions 
were ever discussed or that Mrs. Price ever read the 
papers at this meeting. 
The important matter with regard to this argument 
is that, commencing at Page 81 of Point IV of our origin-
al brief, we show that if there is any question about these 
things, and there obviously is, specific performance 
should not be granted. Respondent's brief is silent, both 
factually and as to law, on this matter, and we think, 
therefore, that our position should be sustained inas-
much as it is not challenged . 
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The argu1nent of Section 1-e, at Page 32 of respond-
ent's brief, is that the trial Court's findings on conflicting 
evidence should not be disturbed. Our contention in this 
respect, however, is that the trial Court 1nisapplied the 
facts and the evidence recited in the trial Court's findings 
of fact is not supported by the record. A careful reading 
of this record will show thi~ to he the case. 
The important thing to remember in discussing this 
argument is that under Points I, II, III, and IV raised 
in our brief there is no conflict in the evidence. Under 
Point I we have argued that there was no legally enforce-
able contract in this case and the facts recited to illus-
trate this under this section of our brief are admitted 
on all sides. 
The same is true of Point II of our brief. Hansen's 
testimony does not effect the legal and factual proposi-
tions expounded there. 
This is equally true of Points III and IV. Our con-
tentions on these points are unchallenged by respondent 
and should, therefore, be sustained. 
The point is, that if the testilnony of Hansen is 
assumed to be true, his version of this transaction will 
not sustain the order of this Court. In addition to this, 
we point out, that his testimony is such that it should 
not be believed. It is indeed difficult to understand why 
Hansen should be allowed to testify to matters diametri-
cally opposed to his acts and conduct, and that such testi-
mony should be incorporated in findings of fact. The 
law is otherwise, as indicated in our brief. 
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The Court is directed to the fact that this trial took 
place in the middle of September, 1951. The memorandum 
decision was in January, 1952, and the arguments there-
on did not take place until May of 1952. 
The findings of fact themselves do not indicate a 
simple cash sale of real estate. If this were the case they 
would not be near as lengthy as they are. Nor are they 
very carefully drawn. The attention of the Court is di-
rected to the following in this regard: 
Paragraph 5 of the findings of fact has to do with 
a rejected offer and is of no materiality. 
Paragraph 6 states that Harry Price was notified 
of the Earnest Money R~ceipt, Exhibit "E," and that he 
indicated the terms were acceptable. There is no evidence 
in this record to support such a finding and if there had 
been the Court would have admitted Exhibit "E" in evi-
dence as against Harry Price, which was not done. Fur-
ther on in the same paragraph the statement is made that 
Exhibit "E" was signed by Mrs. Price and Mrs. Parr 
with Harry Price's knowledge. This is admittedly in-
correct. 
In this same paragraph it is stated that Ravarino 
paid $19,000.00 to Hansen two or three days after Ex-
hibit "E" was signed. Under plaintiff's evidence it was 
two weeks or more. 
The last paragraph of findings of fact No. 6 is 
absolutely without support in the evidence. Hansen testi-
fied on two occasions, as has been indicated previously, 
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that the Prices did not get a copy of Exhibit "E" and, as 
has been indicated time and again, what plaintiff con-
tends is Harry Price's knowledge of an I;~arnest Money 
Receipt is not Exhibit "E" but Exhibit "2." There isn't 
any question about this. Now here does Hansen say that 
price was an1enable to Exhibit ··E." He hedges by saying 
he was agreeable to a deal which everybody understood 
was a trade. 
The material matters in Paragraph 8 are totally 
without support in this record. This finding states baldly 
that plaintiff paid Hansen $19,000.00 and requested 
a deed fromPrices and }.Irs. Parr to Ravarino. It is ad-
mitted and this record can be searched in vain for one 
word of evidence where any request, demand or any-
thing of such a nature was made to the Prices or Mrs. 
Parr for such a deed. 
This same criticism can be Inade of Paragraph 10. 
The fact that plaintiff can and does contend for in its 
brief is that Harry Price might have given somebody 
some 'assurance he would go through with the trade as 
Hansen says, but nowhere did he ever, nor is there any 
evidence that he told anybody that he would convey 
in accordance with Exhibit "E." 
In Paragraph 12 of the findings, plaintiff lapses into 
the same language difficulties he carries on in his brief, 
wherein it is found: 
"Harry Price again indicated the en tire 
transaction and proposed conveyance was satis-
factory." 
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Did plaintiff or the trial Court in this finding mean 
that the conveyance was in conformity with Exhibit "E," 
and since when is a simple sale of real estate entitled 
to be cl·assed "the entire transaction~" 
Again in this Paragraph 12 is a further illustration 
of the carelessness present in the drawing of these find-
ings, where it is stated that Mr. and Mrs. Price met to 
complete the signing and payment of monies. Prices were 
never to pay any money, and the only signing contem-
plated was a deed from Prices to Mollerup and a Real 
Estate Contract with Mollerup as the other party. 
This finding then goes on to say that they refused 
to execute the Warranty Deed which had been prepared. 
Is the Warranty Deed referred to a Warranty Deed to 
Ravarino. The answer is admittedly no. Yet, as previ-
ously indicated in Paragraph 8, the intimation is that the 
deed was to be drawn to him. In addition, it may be 
added, that the findings, conclusion and judgment 
awards attorney's fees of $1,000.00 as against Harry 
Price, which counsel for plaintiff has admitted, on the 
presentation of a recent motion, is wrong. 
We maintained in our main brief that the documents 
tell the whole story and the language of these findings of 
fact, if referable to the evidence in this case, conclusively 
points to this proposition as being true. The documents, 
deeds and transfers referred to therein in the evidence 
as recited mean the documents presented to Prices and 
at this trial and fully confirm the position of appellants 
in this respect and refute the findings. 
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The docun1ents referred to 1nean the final documents 
which n1ust, of necessity, indieate what the transaction 
was. ~\t Page 34, respondent states that we maintain 
that docu1nents tell the whole story and then criticize us 
by arguing that :Mrs. Price and 1\lrs. Parr contradict 
and dispute Exhibit ··E." Our argument remains sound 
because Exhibit .. E" has nothing to do with this trans-
action as planned and intended and worked out by every 
person connected with it. 
POIN"T II. 
EXHIBIT "E" WAS NOT THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
THE PARTIES. 
Exhibit "E" was not introduced in evidence as 
against Harry Price. Therefore, the only ground that he 
can be held under this decree is a purported estoppel. 
In Point II of our main brief (P. 38) we have indicated 
that there is no estoppel for four good reasons: 
1. There was no oral contract, possession or part 
performance. 
2. No representation of an existing fact (our brief, 
P. 52). 
3. Any act of Ra varino was not referable to the 
contract relied on (our brief, P. 52). 
The law on this point is not challenged at all by re-
spondent in his brief. He defaults as to this particular 
aspect of this case. 
4. Respondent is not defrauded if specific per-
formanre i~ denied (our brief, P. 54). 
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The facts of this matter of estoppel, and the law 
cited by respondent is found under Point III of his brief. 
None of our arguments under our Point II are answerP-d 
by respondent there. 
It appears clear then that Harry Price cannot be 
bound. This being so, the women are not bound. This 
Court is referred to Page 63 of our brief where the law 
so holding is set out. 
This law and our position in this respect are not 
challenged. So, even if Exhibit "E" was the agreement 
of the women, it cannot be enforced against them. 
Again in attacking this section of respondent's brief, 
we direct the Court's attention to our argument begin-
ning at Page 71 of our brief, where we maintain that one 
document cannot be plucked from among a number of 
documents drawn to represent a deal and be enforced. 
This is an answer to Point II of respondent's brief and 
this answer is not challenged by respondent in his brief. 
If Exhibit "E" was the agreement between the par-
ties as is contended here by respondent, why were the 
following acts, all of which a,re admitted, and procedures 
carried on by Hansen representing plaintiff and the de-
fendants. 
a. The Mollerup abstracts were sent to Ed Jensen 
for examination. 
b. The Mollerup properties were appraised by Mr. 
Schluter. 
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c. Title perfected to the satisfaction of Ed Jensen 
in the Mollerup properties. 
d. Deed drawn fr01n Prices to Mollerup. 
e. Deed of the Price property drawn and executed 
conveying the same by Mollerup to Ravarino. 
f. Authority of Ravarino to enter the su1n of $19,-
000.00 not authorized until three weeks later. 
g. If Prices were selling under the terms of Exhibit 
"E," why were they required to pay $500.00 cash at the 
time Exhibit "E" was executed! 
h. vVhat was the necessity of Exhibit "J" being ex-
ecuted! 
1. Why were not appellants given a copy of Exhibit 
"E"~ 
J· Why was Harr·y Price urged to sign up the utili-
ties on the Mollerup property! 
k. Why was Hansen, the agent of Ravarino, trying 
to get the Prices to accept the ~Iollerup property as late 
as December~ 
l. Why did Mr. Rich interrogate the Bureau of In-
ternal Revenue and present them a factual problem in-
volving this trade 1 
m. No deed by Prices and Parr to Ravarino was 
ever prepared, or a request for signatures on such an 
instrument requested. 
No satisfactory explanation is made by respondent 
for any of the above acts. None of the1n are consistent 
with respondent's theory that Exhibit "E" was the agree-
ment and it is admitted on each side that all of such acts 
were done. 
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The conclusive factor, in addition to the above, would 
seem to be that Exhibit "E," according to its terms, 
anticipates that further action by way of real. estate con-
tract or deed would be required in order to give this 
Earnest Money Receipt legal effect. But, when the trans-
action was presented in its final form, there is nothing 
whatsoever that gives effect to the terms of Exhibit "E." 
The argument made at Page 36 of respondent's brief 
is that Ravarino was only concerned with the purchase 
of the Price property and that what the Prices did with 
the money was of no concern to him. This is not the 
evidence in the case and the truth is that the agents of 
Ravarino could only acquire the Price property if it could 
be traded to Mollerup. Hansen conceded this at the time 
his deposition was taken. 
Respondent next sets out a number of excerpts from 
Mr. Rich's testimony. These generally confirm the theory 
of defendants in this action and any question as to what 
:M:r. Rich thought this deal to be is removed by his testi-
mony at Pages 155-156 of the record, where he was 
asked: 
"Q. And by that you Ineant, if you could trans-
fer Price's property for Mollerup's property 
there would be no tax to Prices? 
"A. That is right. 
"Q. 'rhis deal that you drew up, which involved 
which is represented by Exhibit F and 0, and 
all the papers-
"A. Yes. 
"Q. It was drawn according to your understand-
ing of what the deal was~ 
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"A. It was drawn aceording to the way the deal 
developed and on instructions of Mr. Hansen, 
see. 
"Q. And these docmnPnts, they are the deeds and 
various things you testified you had drawn 
that affected the proposition in accordance 
with vonr instructions? 
''~-\. Fron~ ~Ir. Hansen, yes sir. 
* * * * 
"Q. Then when the final deal came, the down pay-
Jnent was to he of the Price property instead 
of the cash~ 
"A. That is right." 
No one can say that ~Ir. Rich's understanding of this 
proposition was that Exhibit "E" was the agreement, yet 
Mr. Rich's testimony is cited for this purpose. If Ex-
hibit "E" was the agreement between the parties there 
was no need for ~fr. Rich to be involved in this case 
at all or to draw docu1nents as he did. 
Respondent next sets out two statements from the 
deposition of Mrs. Parr and attempts thereby to warp 
her testimony to support this proposition. It is submitted 
that l\Irs. Parr corrected any misconception she gave by 
these answers in her testimony and by her actions as 
testified to by the other witnesses, including ~Ir. Hansen. 
The crux of respondent's case is contained in his next 
contention where he states that there are two separate 
contracts, Exhibit "E" for the sale of the Price property 
and Exhibit "J" for the sale of the Mollerup property. 
Such a contention is not supported by this record and it 
is completely falsf'. fTansen, himself, while under oath 
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has testified that it is not the case and all of the facts 
listed hereinabove show conclusively that such is not the 
case, nor was such contemplated by anyone connected 
with it. 
After October 5th when Ravarino authorized Han-
sen to offer $19,000.00, Hansen began to put on the heat 
to get Harry Price to act. This act was the signing of the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract providing for his pur-
chase of the Mollerup property. This is the only thing 
that remained to conclude the whole matter. Evidence 
of Hansen's activity in this regard was presented by him-
self when he states that dozens of phone calls were made 
to Jensen and Price, and confirmed by Jensen and Price 
themselves. This activity cmnmenced on October 5th and 
was still being prosecuted as late as December 11th. So 
for two months Price was being subjected to requests to 
sign a contract in conformance with a trade, not Exhibit 
"E." 
How can respondent come before this Court and seri-
ously maintain, as he does in Point II of his brief, "that 
Exhibit 'E' was the agree1nent between the parties" when 
no document of any kind which gave legal effect to Ex-
hibit "E" was ever prepared or was ever offered to de-
fendants, or any one of them, for their signatures? 
Finally we have a situation where a deed to Prices' 
property, signed by Mollerup, is in the possession of 
Ilansen, representing Ravarino, on August 4th. Hansen 
knows this deed is of the Prices' property. If Exhibit 
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"E" is the agreetnent of these parties, how can this fad 
be explained! Did Ravarino or Hansen expect another 
deed from the Prices and ~Irs. Parr of the same prop-
erty? Obviously not. Yet the trial Court, with this 
fact staring it in its face, 8ays in it8 findings of fact that 
Harry Price and Mrs. Parr agreed to sign a \V al'l·an t)· 
Deed to Ravarino for $19,000.00 cash. To reconcile these 
two facts results in the most unusual real estate action 
ever heard of. Yet, if plaintiff's position is to be main-
tained, we have a situation where two deeds of the sante 
property become necessary: one frmn the record owner 
and one fron1 a stranger. Such a condition might be 
possible in the hands of novices or children, but incon-
ceivable in this matter which was handled by professional 
real estate merchants. 
POINT III. 
THE FACTS IN THIS CASE DO NOT WARRANT A 
FINDING OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL OF HARRY PRICE, 
ESPECIALLY AS TO THE TERMS OF EXHIBIT "E". 
This question is closely related to the problem of 
whether Ravarino purchased the Terry strip in reliance 
upon any action of Harry Price. As has been indicated 
previously, this was not the case, and this being so, no 
question of equitable estoppel can arise because among 
other things there was no reliance. This is admitted 
inasmuch as the purported change of position, if any, 
consists of this fact. 
No attempt is made in respondent's brief to refute 
the arguments presented in Point II, beginning at Page 
38 of appellants' brief, nor has there been any attempt 
11""' . 
.:>::>· . 
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to distinguish the cases cited there. The law cited by re-
spondent consists of general statements from textbooks, 
plus isolated excerpts from cases whose facts come no-
where near being similar to those involved in this case. 
At the commencement of respondent's argument, 
P. 44 he sets out nine numbered facts which is the only 
factual argument he makes as to this particular point. 
In considering these facts in connection with estoppel, 
it must be remembered that the representations or acts 
must be legally sufficient and must be made by plaintiff 
to the defendant which affects plaintiff's conduct in some 
manner. With this introduction these nine propositions 
will be discussed. 
(1) This statement merely recites the signing of 
the listing agreement with Hansen. The price asked was 
$35,000.00. It contained no obligation to sell. This docu-
ment has nothing to do with the case and respondent does 
not claim anything for it. 
(2) This refers to an admittedly rejected offer and 
put Hansen on notice that a trade only was acceptable · 
and that a trade arranged which was all right with Mrs. 
Price would be acceptable to Mr. Price. Plaintiff had 
no knowledge of this. Such a fact, if true, could not pos-
sibly be a basis for an estoppel and this fact in the last 
analysis confirms the theory of defendants and the facts 
presented by defendants. 
(3) This statement affirms the position of defend-
ants, that a trade with Mollerup was contemplated. This 
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stateinent adtnits the fact that ~Iollerup's property was 
involved in this transaction, and Exhibit "E," by it:-; 
terms, has nothing to do whatsoeYer with ~[ollerup or 
his property. There is no ele1nent of estoppel involved in 
this state1nent. 
(.f) This state1nent is an absolute mis-statement of 
the facts. This record, as has previously been pointed 
out, shows only that Mr. Hansen asserts he explained the 
provisions of an arrangen1ent or deal to Mrs. Price. The 
evidence of Hansen, as has been pointed out, is to the 
effect that :Jir. Price had never ~een Exhibit "E" and on 
two occasions he testified he did not give the Prices a 
copy of Exhibit "E." 
Plaintiff asserts: 
"Every requiren1ent and provision of Exhibit 
'E' was explained to and discussed by Mr. Price." 
What is there to explain and discuss about a cash sale 
for $19,000.00~ How can plaintiff say that a sale for 
$19,000.00 cash was made known to llarry Price by his 
agent when the agent draws the transaction in its final 
form as a trade wherein $18,000.00 credit is allowed on 
such trade, and no objection is made to the papers so 
drawn. 
( 5) The state1nent of Paragraph 5 reaches the 
limits of inconsistency. It is true abstracts were brought 
to date and examined. What connection has the examina-
tion of the Mollerup abstract got to do with Exhibit "E" 
except to contradict it. If the fact were that Exhibit "E" 
was explained to :Mr. Price and he understood it, why was 
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it necessary for Prices' attorney to examine the Moiler-
up abstract? 
The transaction as explained to him, does not refe!' 
to a cash sale under the terms of Exhibit "E," but a 
trade. This is still another example of where words 
such as "deal," "arrangement," etc., are used by plaintiff 
when the true meaning thereof is a trade, but they as-
sunle it means assent to Exhibit "E," which is neve~ the 
( 6) Here we have another mis-statement. The deed 
from Terry was executed the day after Mollerup execut-
ed a deed of the Price property to Ravarino. 
In spite of the statement of plaintiff that he deliver-
ed the money to Hansen the day he received the Terry 
property, with the instructions to Hansen that his offer 
was only good for a week, plaintiff argues: "at the same 
time plaintiff left with Hansen for delivery to defend-
ants the purchase price for the fifth south property." 
Plaintiff says Hansen left with an offer. This assertion 
1s a deliberate distortion of plaintiff's statement. 
( 7) It is true, the closing documents were prepared 
in accordance with the understanding of all. This is the 
only statement in this paragraph that is not completely 
false. These documents were not approved and posses-
sion of the Mollerup property was never taken. No 
estoppel arises from this paragraph. 
(8) This statement is true, but what relation has 
it to any matter of equitable estoppel~ To this statement 
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might be added the fact that Ed Jen~Pn ~wore und(lf' oath 
that Harry had never told hin1 he had approved the deal, 
and his actions in not exrunining the papers fully eon-
firm this. On the other hand, Hansen baldly declares that 
Ed Jensen told hin1 that Harry Price said everything 
was all right. Jensen denies this. Here again Hansen 
in one place says that Ed Jensen told hin1 Harry had 
approved the deal. At another place he says Ed Jensen 
told him Harry Price was dragging his feet. How can 
one tell fr01n Hansen's testin1ony what Ed Jensen told 
him? It is adn1itted that Hansen called Jensen a nmnber 
of times. 'Vhy the calls if everything was all right with 
Harry f If a cash deal was involved, why all the tele-
phone calls by Hansen? If a cash deal was involved, what 
more was necessary than a deed from Prices and Parr 
to Ravarino? Why wasn't such a deed presented? Why 
was not an offer to present such a deed made during- ~:u, 
whole time from October 5th to December 11th~ 
(9) This statement is merely to the effect that 
Harry Price refused to trade. No element of estoppel 
is involved in this paragraph. 
There is absolutely not one fact recited in the nine 
paragraphs above commented upon which has anything 
to do with equitable estoppel. Setting them out is a de-
liberate effort to confuse this issue, which is continued 
thereafter in respondent's brief by the citation of his 
authority. 
Each case has been examined and there is not one 
whose facts are similar to the situation that exists here. 
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A number of citations are taken from Pomeroy. Pomeroy, 
himself, in speaking of the use and application of the 
broad principles he expounded, advises caution and an 
examination of the facts of each case. His thought on thiE: 
subject is found in Hilton v. Sloan, (Ut.) 108 P. at 693, 
where he says: 
"One caution however is necessary and very 
important. It would be unsafe and misleading to 
rely on these general requisites as applicable to 
every case without examining the instances in 
which they have been modified or limited." 
At Page 51 of plaintiff's brief, he confesses that 
his search has discovered no cases exactly like the one 
here. Graves v. Godthwait, 26 N.E. 860, cited at Page 43 
in appellant's brief, is exactly this case on its facts. 
There plaintiff purchased other property relying on de-
fendants' promise to convey the property involved in the 
lawsuit. See, also, Knoff v. Grace, 190 P. 526, cited at 
Page 44 of appellant's brief. This case is identical in 
principle to the case at bar. The law cited at our brief, 
Page 44, et seq., on this point, shows conclusively that 
any conduct of the promisee must be referable to the 
contract being enforced. In other words, it must be con-
duct in the performance of the contract, rather than re-
liance upon it. In applying this rule there must first be 
an agreement proved. As we pointed out in our original 
brief, there is not such an agreement established in this 
case. Respondent does not contend that the law is other-
wise. Yet, under the admitted facts, a condition exists 
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here where the law above eited precludes hin1 from rP-
covery. 
After exhaustive research, and after exan1ination 
of the cases cited by respondent. it can safely be said by 
the writer hereof that no case exists which allows spe-
cific performance where an anticipatory statement re-
sults in acts not in furtherance of the contraet sued up-
on. The necessary requisites to establish equitable estop-
pel are contained in Point II of appellants' brief, com-
mencing at Page 38. 
Reference will now be made to the authority cited 
by appellants' in their brief, conunencing on Page 49. 
The first case is Wolf, Administratrix, v. Walling-
ford Bank and Trust Co., 1 A. 2d 143, 117 A.L.R. 932. 
This case was an action at law for damages. Plaintiff 
consented to a foreclosure on her property upon the oral 
understanding of defendant that after such foreclosure 
the property would be reconveyed to plaintiff. No such 
reconveyance was made. During the foreclosure plaintiff 
made substantial ilnprovements on the house and as the 
Court said, "added substantially to the value of the real 
estate." 
Here there was possession and the con tract on the 
part of plaintiff was completely executed. This Court 
also indicated that specific performance probably would 
not have been granted in this case, hut that inasn1uch as 
it was an action for damages the degree of proof was 
not as high and plaintiff sustained her burden only to 
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the effect that there had been a waiver of the Statute 
of Frauds so that a remedy at law was available to her. 
The Court in the Wallingford Bank case, above cited, 
points out that there is a conflict of authority on the 
question of whether an estoppel may be raised to defeat 
the statute where a plaintiff has acted solely in reliance 
on an oral agreement. It then states that those cases 
which follow such a rule limit it to "cases where the state-
ment or promise relates to an intended abandonment of 
an existing right and is made to influence others who 
have in fact been influenced by it." 
The Court goes on to say "the effect of such an eR-
toppel as in this case is not to make binding 'promissory 
representations as to future action dependent upon a con-
tract to be entered into' which it was said could not be 
done in Un.ion MuJual Life Ins. Co. v. Mowry, 96 U.S. 
544, 24 L. Ed. 674." 
In other words, the Court in the vVallingford Bank 
case holds squarely that in no case can anticipatory 
promises as to future action be the basis of an estoppel. 
All of the purported conduct of Harry Price is admit-
tedly anticipatory. 
The next cases cited are five (5) Utah cases, none 
of which has a factual situation anywhere near the the 
one presently before the Court. 
Hilton v. Sloan, 37 Ut. 359. This is the case of John 
R. Park and his wife referred to in the argmnent. This 
Court held that Mrs. Hilton, the plaintiff, was estopped 
42 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
from asserting her dower right against the estate of 1\Ir. 
Park or his grantees after she had expressly, and in 
writing, waived such existing right and represented to 
the community for years that she wa~ not, nor had she 
ever been, his wife, but was the wife of Mr. Hilton, to 
whom she bore ten (10) children. rrhere was no feature 
of an anticipatory prmnise in the Hilton rase. 
The next is Kerr u. Hillyard, 51 Ft. 364. In this case 
the promisee had fully executed his contract. The Stat-
ute of Frauds was raised to defeat the authority of the 
agent, but the contract of agency had been fully executed 
and the Court held that the Statute of Frauds had noth-
ing to do with the case. 
Ta'YI!Yter v. Provo Reservoir Co., 76 Ut. 335, was a 
case where plaintiff attempted to ntake defendent irriga-
tion company change the course of a canal after 26 years 
acquiescence in a previous change. Plaintiff had been a 
party to a petition for the previous change and it would 
have cost the canal company $30,000.00 to make the 
change at this late date. The Court held that the plaintiff 
in this position was estopped to enforce a written agree-
ment 26 years old in the face of his acquiescence. 
Bamberger Co. v. Certified Productions, Inc., 88 Ut. 
194, is a case where the Statute of Frauds was raised hy 
plaintiff when defendant tried to alter the terms of a 
written lease. The change in the lease had been fully 
performed by the defendant at great expense and the 
Court held that the subject matter of _the original lease 
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had not been changed, but that only the method of per-
forming it. 
Latses v. Niclc Floor, Inc., 99 Ut. 214, is a case in-
volving a lease. Plaintiff maintained the original lease 
was not authorized. The Court held there was apparent 
authority for the execution of such lease and, in any 
event, the original term of the lease had been performed. 
This case involved the option for extension of this lease. 
In that case the lease agreement had been fully perform-
ed by defendant and substantial improvements had been 
made under the terms thereof which entitled defendant 
to such an extension. 
The next cases cited are, Vogel v. Shaw, 294 P. 687, 
and Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U.S. 578. These cases 
are in line with those cited by appellants in their brief. 
In these cases the promisee purchases land in pursuance 
of the promise or agreement of the promissor. The 
promisee in each instance intentionally waives and aba;n-
dons an existing right, and in ea.ch case the promisee 
has executed his part of the arrangement at great expense 
to himself, which would amount to fraud. There is 
positively no anticipatory promise in either of these 
cases, as their facts clearly indicate. 
The case of Boelter v. Blake, 12 N.W. 2d 327, is cited 
at Page 56 of respondent's brief and is quoted from ex-
tensively. In that case there was possession and the 
Court found there had been substantial part performance 
of the oral agreement sued upon and actual acquiescence 
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in such perfortnance with knowledge by the wife without 
objection from her. There was no pr01nise to perform a 
future act and the perfor1nance of the promisee was of 
the oral agremnent, involving the property in litigation 
not in other property, as i~ the case here. 
A conm1on fact in all cases where the doctrine of 
estoppel has been applied is that the evidence of such has 
been clear and convincing. Over and over again re-
spondent in his brief states that Hansen testified that 
Price 
"Unequivocally and definitely stated that he 
would go along with the deal and to go ahead and 
purchase the Terry property." 
The "deal" that is referred to is the trade arrange-
ment, not a cash sale. Now here in this record has Han-
sen testified that Harry Price stated to him that he would 
sell his property to Ravarino for $19,000.00 cash. And 
he didn't testify as stated by respondent at all. 
The attention of the Court is directed to Pages 87 
and 88 of this record which contain the testimony of Han-
sen on this point. r.l1his is all Hansen has to say: 
"Now it looks like everything is okeh. * * * I 
told Harry that and then after the first part of 
September, or the last part of September, I told 
him we were ready to close that now and I wanted 
to be sure there wouldn't be any trouble. "" "" • He 
said that's fine, go ahead." 
He merely testified that Price said it was alright 
with him for Hansen to buy the Terry strip. 
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There is no question in this case that the word "it" 
and the "deal" to be closed with the Prices was the trade. 
How can it be said that such language amounts to an un-
equivocal promise and conforms to the rule that an oral 
statement to be enforced must be clear, unequivocal and 
convincing, especially in view of the fact that the over-
whelming weight of the evidence is completely opposed 
to such conversation ever being made by Mr. Price, any-
way. 
The purchase of the Terry strip was not induced by 
Harry Price, but, on the other hand, the purchase of the 
Terry strip under the evidence in this case was used as 
a lever to force the Prices and Mrs. Parr to go through 
with this trade in spite of the differences that existed be-
tween the Prices and Mollerup as to the terms of their 
trade. This is illustrated by the following facts that 
are admitted: 
a. As early as August 8th, Hansen had signed Rav-
arino to an offer to purchase the Terry strip. 
This indicates that Ravarino wanted the Price prop-
erty together with the right of way at the rear before 
anything was presented to the Prices, and that Hansen, 
as his agent, was instructed to obtain both parcels. N oth-
ing that Harry Price had ever done had provoked this 
action on the part of Ravarino. 
b. Hansen had told Mrs. Price prior to her signing 
any papers that Ravarino had purchased the Terry 
strip. This is conclusively shown by her statement and 
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the fact that this information was imparted to Mr. 
Schluter at the time of his appraisal and could only have 
been made for the purpose of forcing the Prices to dis-
pose of their property because railroad trackage to the 
rear was no longer available to the1n so that their prop-
erty had become less valuable. 
c. The Terry strip was not purchased until a deed 
from :Jiollerup of the Price property to Ravarino had 
been delivered to Hansen, so that all that remained in 
order for everything to go as planned was that the docu-
ments representing the trade be executed. It was at this 
point in the proceedings that it becan1e ilnportant that 
the Prices and "Jlrs. Parr go through with the trade, 
and it was for this reason that Ravarino offered to raise 
his price $1,000.00. However, the matter of this addi-
tional $1,000.00 was never brought to the attention of the 
Prices, i.e., they were never advised that they would he 
allowed another $1,000.00 credit if they went through 
with the trade, or, they may have done so, and no law 
suit would have resulted. 
d. The admitted fact is that I-Iansen frantically 
tried to get the Prices and ~frs. Parr to consummate 
this trade from the fore part of October clear into De-
cember, for over a rnonth after this action was filed. 
Plaintiff argues in this section of his brief that he 
is defrauded because he has not received the benefit of 
his bargain. The cases cited in our brief commencing 
at Page 55 indicate clearly that this does not constitute 
fraud, nor is it any ground for the granting of specific 
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performance. The illustration set out on Page 58 con-
clusively disposes of this argument. 
They then accuse defendants of being unfair in offer-
ing to restore the price of the Terry strip, by statements 
on Page 56 of their brief, in a pure attempt to confuse 
the issue. If the full purchase price of the Terry prop-
erty is repaid is not the commission paid, and wherein 
has Ravarino lost the use of $19,000.00~ The only loss of 
money in bringing this law suit is lost to the Prices and 
Mrs. Parr. 
By this argument at Page 56, respondent, at this late 
date, is trying to inject into this lawsuit purely foreign 
matters. If plaintiff was damaged, the matter should 
have been pleaded and proved in this lawsuit. This Court 
must assume that if plaintiff was prejudiced in any man-
ner that such would have been presented to the trial 
Court. Nothing of this nature was presented and the 
facts presented in this argument are wholly without sup-
port. See Richardson v. Taylor Land and Livestock 
Co. (Wash.), 171 P. 2d 703. 
Finally, respondent tries to give this Court the im-
pression that it was months later that Prices offered to 
repay Ravarino for the money he expended in purchas-
ing the Terry strip. This is not the case and the record 
does not so show. The fact is, that such an offer was 
made through November and December of 1950 while 
efforts were being made to adjust the matters between 
Prices and :Mollerup. 
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CONCLUSION 
The brief of respondent has not been addressed, nor 
has it in any way n1et the arguments presented in appel-
lants' brief. Respondent repeats over and over the fact 
that all parties knew what the deal was. rrhey then try 
to argue that this deal is a sale for a cash price of 
$19,000.00. Now here in this record is there evidence 
that anyone knew of such a transaction being the deal. 
Plaintiff's representative accepted a deed of Prices' 
property from ~Iollerup on October 4th. This deed is an 
exhibit. How then cm1 they maintain that they are 
entitled to another deed fron1 Prices and Mrs. Parr 
as a part of this transaction 1 The trial Court has ~o 
held and in its doing so has committed a graYe, serious 
and expensive injustice to these defendants. 
In Section I of our original brief, P. 22, we demon-
strated that there was no contract and why there was 
no contract, i.e., there was no offer or acceptance. This 
argument and the authorities cited are not controverted 
by respondent. To say that Harry Price "assented" 
does not answer this argt1n1ent. 
Under Point II of our original brief, P. 38, we point-
ed out that there was no part performance or fraud 
involved and that this case cmnes within the Statute of 
Frauds. This contention has not been challenged. The 
legal aspects of this problem should be resolved in ap-
pellants' favor. 
In Point III of our brief, P. 60, three legal proposi-
tion were presented : 
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1. That Harry Price is not bound so the women 
are not. Nothing is cited in respondent's brief to con-
trovert the legal authority cited on this point. 
2. That Exhibit "E" is uncertain. The reading of 
this document in view of all the facts and transaction 
as contemplated by all, leads to no other conclusion. 
3. We point out that you cannot take one document 
which does not represent the transaction and have such 
document enforced. No law is cited by respondent to con-
trovert this proposition and its truth is obvious from the 
factual standpoint based on this record. 
In Point IV of our brief, P. 81, we direct the Court's 
attention to the Inisapprehension and mistake, setting 
forth eight facts which conclusively prove this point. 
These fttcts are enlarged in this brief. The law presented 
under this point has not been controverted or discussed 
by respondent. 
The documents prepared and executed show that the 
Terry strip was bought on October 5th by Ravarino. 
Ravarino, the plaintiff in this action, stated unequi-
vocally that on this same day he made an offer to Price 
to buy for $19,000.00. The trial Court is obliged to find 
this fact, and this one fact conclusively disposes of any 
equitable estoppel inasmuch as the purchase of the Terry 
strip is the only act pleaded or proved in support of such 
theory. 
The Court by this judgment has made a contract 
for these people. It is a contract never intended by any-
one. (See our Brief, Page 60, et seq.) 
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And, finally, the inequity of this decision can be 
startingly demonstrated by the fact that a reputable 
banker appraised the one warehouse lot for $20,000.00. 
Under this decision these defendants are required to part 
with both lots for $19,000.00. It is submitted that such a 
result is totally unwarranted under the facts of this 
case and the evidence presented to the trial Court. 
As compared to this unequitable result, plaintiff 
was not defrauded in 1950 by anything defendants said 
or did, and the same is true as of today. In other words, 
he has never been victi1nized at all. On the other hand, 
defendants have undergone the expense of an extended 
trial and appeal, in addition to losing their property 
for a wholly inadequate price. This situation repre-
sents the equities involved. 
The fact still re1nains that if this deal had been 
signed up by all parties concerned in October, as con-
templated, $1,000.00 found its way into the pocket of 
Lewis Hansen unbeknowns to anyone. The document 
that permitted this is Exhibit '"E," which was seen only 
by Hansen and possibly by Ravarino in it:-; present form. 
This is the contract enforced herein and the only pur-
pose for its execution was to effect the above result. 
We earnestly urge that this case be decided accord-
ing to what happened, rather than in accordance and 
in furtherance of this scheme of Lewis Hansen. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~IULLINER, PRINCE & !1:ULLINER, 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
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